Wookiee Statements, Semanticism, and Reasonable Assertion by GARCÍA RAMÍREZ, Eduardo
Abstract
It is assumed that the content of an assertion is determined either by the seman-
tically defined content or by the interaction of the latter with the context. Here I
present a counterexample by means of the Wookiee problem. After considering sev-
eral options I offer what appears to be its most satisfactory solution. This requires
that we give up the assumption in favor of a view according to which it may be that
semantic information does not at all determine the content of an assertion, not even
partly so. 
Keywords: assertion, semantic content, context, presupposition.
1. Assertion 
All conversations take place in a context and convey something by uttering
some or other sentence. On the received view (see Stalnaker 1978 and 1987) the
goal of an assertion is to communicate what is said. The context and content of an
assertion interact in order to determine what is said.
In order to properly describe this interaction Stalnaker 1978 proposes a two-
dimensional model. One dimension is determined by the contextually relevant
information: e.g., who is the speaker, which are the salient objects, and what does
the world look like. The other dimension is determined by semantic information:
the meaning of the words used by the participants.
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This model has been used and interpreted in different ways. Stalnaker 2004
claims he intended to use his model with a “metasemantic” interpretation according
to which the model offers a mere description of the context-content interaction
within conversations. Others (see Chalmers and Jackson 2001 and Chalmers 2002)
intend to use the model with a “semantic” interpretacion according to which the
model offers a description of the semantic and conceptual knowledge that compe-
tent speakers have. Both interpretations, however, agree on what I call “the seman-
ticist assumption” or SA for short:
Semanticist Assumption (SA): the content of an assertion is determined either by
the semantically defined content of the expression used or by the interaction
between the latter and the context.
It is easy to see how SA works within two-dimensional semantics. According to
Chalmers 2002, for example, every linguistic term has two different kinds of mean-
ing or content. On the one hand, A-intensions track epistemic dependence.
Epistemic dependence tells us how the sentence’s truth-value depends on the speak-
er’s a priori (i.e., semantic) knowl edge. For example, for all I know a priori a pure-
ly indexical use1 of the English sentence ‘I am here’ is true if and only if the speak-
er is located at the place of the utterance. On the other hand, C-intensions track fac-
tual dependence. Factual dependence tells us how the sentence’s truth-value
depends on the facts. For example, if M uses ‘I am here’ indexically while being in
Cambridge, what M says will be true if and only if M is in Cambridge.
Two-dimensional semantics (see Stalnaker 1978, Chalmers 2002, 2004, and
2006) can be understood as claiming that for every declarative assertion or thought
there is a two-dimensional intension that maps pairs of worlds (one considered as
actual and the other as coun terfactual) into truth-values. The result is a two-dimen-
sional matrix where the horizontal lines describe propositions that are determined
by the interaction between content and the context. Stalnaker 1978 famously argues
that the corresponding two-dimensional matrix includes a second distinguishable
kind of proposition: that which is described by the diagonal of the matrix.2
The central claim of two-dimensional semantics is that the content of an asser-
tion will be either a horizontal proposition or the diagonal one. There is no third
option. Now, given that both, horizontals and diagonal, are determined either by the
semantically defined content or by the interaction of the latter with the context, the
two-dimensional view is committed to SA.
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1 I mean “purely indexical” in Kaplan’s way in order to exclude demonstrative uses of ‘here’ where
the speaker is pointing at a particular location distinct from hers; e.g., when someone is trying to give
her location by pointing at a map and saying ‘I live here’.
2 For several reasons, Chalmers 2004 and Stalnaker (see Block and Stalnaker, 1999, and Stalnaker,
2004) distinguish this from Chalmers’ A-proposition. The distinction, however, is irrelevant for the
purpose of this discussion.
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Whether two-dimensionalist or not, almost everyone seems to agree with
Stalnaker’s 1978 claim that the content of an assertion is determined in the way
described by SA. Some such assumption seems to underlie, for example, the current
debate concerning relativism (see Egan 2005 and Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009). 
Some reject the idea that all truth-conditionally relevant information is seman-
tically encoded in favor of what is known as truth-conditional pragmatics (see
Chomsky 1996, Travis 1997, Bezuidenhout 2002 and Asher and Lascarides 2003).
On this view, there is truth-conditionally relevant contextual information that is not
semantically encoded. Still, it is assumed the content of an assertion is at least part-
ly determined by the semantically encoded information. Something like SA is taken
to be true even within truth-conditional pragmatics. 
The case is clearer for Neo-Rusellians like Soames 2007 who reject the two-
dimensional approach just described. On this view, the content of an assertion is
always the semantically defined proposition. This suggests an even stronger
endorsement of SA.
So it seems fair to say philosophers of language have adopted a semanticist atti-
tude by assuming that something like SA is true. As I will show, this assumption is
mistaken. There are informative assertions the content of which is not semantically
determined at all, not even partly so. 
2. Theoretic constraints
Speakers seem to utter sentence tokens, more often than not, for communicative
purposes. It is plausible to think that utterances of declarative sentences count as
asser tions. And it is plausible to think that what the assertion expresses for the
speaker is identified with what the speaker wants to communicate with her asser-
tion. If this is accepted, then there must be a way in which a theory that assumes SA
helps us understand this phenomenon. 
At first glance it seems like it can readily do so. All it needs to do is find out
which content, either the horizontal or the diagonal, gets to play the role of the
asserted content. But, when it comes to communication, there are some constraints.
I take it for granted that any account –for sure, any two-dimensional account– of
communication must observe the following principles owed to Stalnaker (1978). 
Informative: A proposition asserted (or thought) is always true in some but not
all of the possible worlds in the context. 
No gaps: Any assertive utterance (or thought) should express a proposition, rel-
ative to each world in the context, and that proposition should have a truth-value in
each world in the context. 
No ambiguities: The same proposition is expressed (or thought) relative to each
world in the context. 
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These principles work under the assumption that the goal of an assertion is to
reduce the set of possibilities in the context set. This cannot be achieved if the rel-
evant proposition is either necessarily true or necessarily false, that’s what we need
the first principle for. The same happens with the second principle. If there is a
world where the proposition in question has no truth-value then we will not know
whether that possibility should be carved out of the space of possibilities; that’s
what the second principle is for. Similar considerations apply to the third principle.
Propositions can be understood as recipes for logical carving. If the matrix offers
many of them we will not know which recipe to follow.3
It should be clear that any theory that accepts SA must embrace these principles.
They determine what a given speaker expresses by means of her assertive utterance.
So here comes the challenge, can a theory that accepts SA account for the way in
which speakers utter sentences to communicate information while being con-
strained by the three principles above? The answer, I believe, is negative. 
3. The Wookiee problem
There are successful (i.e., informative) assertions where neither a horizontal nor
the diagonal proposition –i.e., neither the C-intension nor the A-intension, on
Chalmers’ view– can be said to determine the content of the assertion in light of the
principles above. 
Consider the following situation. I am looking for Tom. We agreed to meet at
the department at noon, either in the commons room or in his office. It’s noon and
as I walk through the hallway I call out p: “Tom, where are you?” Tom replies by
uttering q: “I am here” from within his office. Tom’s speech act observes the prin-
ciples. It lets me know where he is (i.e., not ambiguous), it is contingent (i.e.,
informative), and does not seem to be incomplete (i.e., has no truth-value or mean-
ing gaps). The question is, then, how should we represent this situation? 
There are two worlds in the set of possibilities: world w1 in which Tom is in the
commons room and world w2 in which Tom is in his office. The purpose of the con-
versation is to let me know which of these worlds is the actual one. Matrix A1 rep-
resents the two-dimensional proposition of Tom’s utterance q. 
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3 The third principle comes with a wrinkle. On the semantic interpretation, the as sertion (or assertive
thought) will correspond to two propositions at once. If present, an ambiguity will be represented in
the horizontal lines, which correspond to the external content. Followers of the view could simply
reply that there is no ambiguity since, in those cases, there is still a single proposition, the diagonal or
A proposition, represented by the matrix. If this is so, then so be it. The point is irrelevant for the pur-
poses of the present discussion.
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A1 w1 w2
w1 T F
w2 F T
So, which proposition did Tom just assert? There are two candidates: the diag-
onal and a horizontal. But none of them observe the principles. The diagonal propo-
sition fails to meet Informative because the sentence Tom uttered is bound to be true
in every possible world in which he utters it. In short, it has a necessary diagonal,
which is trivial. The horizontal propositions, determined by the C-intensions, go
against No ambiguities because Tom’s utterance expresses different propositions
relative to different worlds. So there are different horizontal propositions. Hence,
neither of the two candidates explains how Tom’s utterance observes the principles. 
Matrix-level update?
If you are a two-dimensionalist you might be thinking: “but why should we be
forced to pick one, either a horizontal or a diagonal proposition. Why not update on
the whole matrix?”
The only kind of “matrix-level” update that I know of is Stalnaker’s diagonal-
ization by means of the dagger operator. Stalnaker 1978 intro duces the dagger as a
pragmatic tool, but there is no problem if we want to interpret it semantically (see
Chalmers 2002). The dagger † works in a very straightforward fashion: it takes a
matrix as an input and gives a matrix as its output by taking the diagonal of the for-
mer and projecting it on the horizontal lines of the latter. To illustrate, the result of
applying † to Tom’s original problematic Matrix A1 is given by Matrix †A1. 
†A1 w1 w2
w1 T T
w2 T T
As you may see, the result is no good. I do not seem to have learned anything
in virtue of the semantics of Tom’s utterance. Matrix †A1 does not offer any recipe
to update from Tom’s utterance. Of course, there might be other more interesting,
perhaps even more semantic, kinds of “matrix-level” update. So far, there seems to
be no alternative one. Furthermore, it’s unlikely that any non-arbitrary matrix-level
strategy will solve the problem. 
It goes without saying that the pragmatic use of † is in no better stand ing (see
Stalnaker 1978). So far, Tom’s felicitous assertion is problematic for both sorts of
two-dimensionalism. 
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A more natural response 
It is commonly agreed (see Stalnaker 1978 and 2002) that there are at least two
processes by means of which one can be informative. Accommodation, on the one
hand, takes place prior to the acceptance of the content and after the utterance takes
place. It simply adds on one more presupposition to the context, namely, that the
speech act took place. Reduction, on the other hand, takes place after the acceptance
of the asserted content by eliminating incompatible worlds. This gives the two-
dimensionalist a response: we are in trouble because we left out an important step:
we have not yet accommodated the speech act into the context. 
The speech act is an observable fact. The fact that we communicate verbally
presupposes that we both are able to hear the sounds produced by one another. More
specifically, Tom presupposes that I presuppose that he presupposes that I can iden-
tify the sound of his speech act and where it comes from. Tom is correct. I presup-
pose this. Furthermore, from the observable fact that Tom has uttered a sound I can
infer that the utterance comes from his office. 
This gives us a derived set of possibilities: the result of accommodation from
the observed fact that the utterance took place. This is the context in which I am
supposed to interpret Tom’s utterance and determine its content. It includes the pre-
supposition (Φ), from which we can derive (U). 
(Φ) that Tom is speaking from within his office. 
(U) that Tom is in his office. 
But (U) is incompatible with w1, the world in which Tom is in the commons
room. So I must get rid of it. The accommodated context includes only w2, the world
in which Tom is in his office. This, apparently, solves the problem. The accommo-
dated matrix represents a single contingent proposition: i.e., (U). Such proposition
can explain how Tom’s speech act observes the principles of communication. 
Another troubling fact
Unfortunately, the problem is still standing. For now that we have updated by
accommodating the fact of the utterance the semantically determined content of
Tom’s utterance doesn’t have any communicative work to do. Any utterance–indeed
any production of noises–would have the same communicative effect. So now we
are left wondering why would Tom–and for that matter, anyone–would ever make
that utterance to convey that information. 
What we learn from accommodation, by definition, has nothing to do with the
content of the uttered sentence. Thus, it is not something that can be explained by
any semantically determined proposition. However, we get too much from accom-
modating these presuppositions. So much that prior to the acceptance of content I
already know that the actual world is w2. This preempts the semantically deter-
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mined content from being informative. 
It follows that, according to the theory, the semantically determined content of
any appropriate use4 of the English sentence ‘I am here’ is uninformative. Given
that the assertion is informative, it follows that the content of the assertion is not in
any way semantically determined.
The Wookiee problem
Let me make this more dramatic. Suppose that Tom replies, instead, by uttering
a sentence-token from a different language, say, r: “Ich bin hier”. Is this a success-
ful communicative act? Tom presupposes that I presuppose that he presupposes that
I can identify the sounds he is uttering and, hence, that I can infer the location of his
utterance from the observable fact that it took place. This presupposition is easily
satisfied. 
This time things look a bit worse. Not only is the content informatively irrele-
vant. It is not even relevant whether the participants are competent in the use of the
language of which a sentence-token has been uttered. How is it then that speakers
always try to convey the semantically determined content? 
Why not twist this a little bit more? Tom is a Star Wars fan. In partic ular, he is
pretty knowledgeable about Chewbacca and the Wookiee species. He knows, for
example, that they speak Shyriiwook. Like many other fans, he knows pretty well
how to utter a sentence-token of Shyriiwook. You only have to utter two vocal
sounds without using your vocal chords. I walk through the hallway and ask, p:
“Tom, where are you?” Could Tom not reply with his favorite Shyriiwook sentence?
If he does I can do the same sort of accommodation described above and find out
where he is. He is not even speaking a human language (Yes, Tom is amazing). Yet,
his utterance is informative and successful in meeting the goal of the conversation. 
What is the Wookie problem about? The problem is not that the theory is unable
to explain those cases where Tom decides to speak like Chewbacca. The problem,
rather, is that the meaning of ‘I am here’ is not playing any interesting role in the story
about how Tom uses it to communicate. Assuming the truth of SA, one would have
thought that ‘I am here’ is, in virtue of its semantics, uniquely well suited for convey-
ing the sort of information that Tom is trying to convey. But it seems that it is not. 
That is the Wookiee Problem. Thus far, the theory cannot tell us how Wookiee
utterances –e.g, Tom’s q: “I am here”– manage to be informative in virtue of assert-
ing any sort of semantically determined content. 
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4. A reasonable solution
Speakers usually observe certain principles when communicating. It is good
communicative practice, for example, to be relevant, clear, not ambiguous, brief,
and orderly. So, when I ask p: “Tom, where are you?” Tom should not reply with
“No worries!” unless he wants to change the topic; or with “Ich bin hier”, unless he
wants to be obscure. Similarly, Tom should not reply in Shyriiwook because that
would be obscure, unclear, and irrelevant. 
This gives us a simple solution. Why is q, an utterance of the English sentence
‘I am here’, uniquely well suited for Tom to convey the sort of information that he
wants to communicate? The answer is: because q is uniquely well-suited, in virtue
of its semantics, for Tom to say something relevant, clear, brief, etc. 
The example we are concerned with involves a context in which by sim ply
accommodating the fact of the utterance we manage to update all the relevant infor-
mation. Yet, it will be best, for communicative considerations, if the speaker picks
an utterance the semantically determined content of which coincides with the infor-
mation we have contextually inferred. That way we will avoid confu sions and mis-
understandings. For example, an utterance of q semantically expresses the same
proposition that gets communicated, thereby allowing Tom to be relevant. 
Wookiee utterances seem to carry too many presuppositions with them; so many
that the semantically determined content becomes irrelevant, but only partly so. The
informative purpose of the speech act is satisfied prior to the acceptance of content.
But being informative is not the only goal of a conversation. By uttering q Tom
manages to be well behaved. 
This is not the good old two-dimensional picture, clearly. However, it might still
be acceptable for two-dimensionalists. It would be surprising otherwise. They sim-
ply need to add something like: when the principles of assertion are not observed,
it must be that they are being exploited for manners’ sake. 
The solution is, however, clearly incompatible with the generally accepted
truth of SA. 
Semanticist Assumption (SA): the content of an assertion is determined either by
the semantically defined content of the expression used or by the interaction
between the latter and the context.
If the reasonable account of the Wookiee problem I just gave is correct, and I
see no reason to think it is not, then the content of the assertion is not determined
either by the semantically defined content of the expression ‘I am here’ or by the
interaction of the latter with the context. The only relevant role that the semantic
features of ‘I am here’ play in this case is purely diplomatic, to put it somehow.
Semantic information is relevant only for manner’s sake, not for content’s sake.
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5. Wookiee statements and stipulations
Appropriate utterances of the English sentence ‘I am here’ are, of course, not the
only ones that can help make the case against SA. There are many other cases, with-
in and across languages, of Wookiee statements. Consider, for example, appropriate
uses of sentences such as ‘I am speaking now’, ‘I am here now’, and ‘I exist’.5 All
appropriate utterances of these sentences are such that the presuppositions are
enough to determine the content of the assertion. Even before determining the
meaning of the relevant sentences, as soon as the speech act takes place the audi-
ence knows that the speaker is speaking, that the speaker is located at the place and
time of the utterance, and that the speaker in fact exists. I dub these “Wookiee state-
ments.”
Wookiee statements have one further feature in common: their associated two-
dimensional matrix is made up of different contingent horizontal propositions and
a necessary diagonal. As such, they are similar to another kind of problematic state-
ments: stipulations. This is not the place to offer a theory of stipulations. But
reflecting on some plausible considerations will help us see that they constitute one
more case of Wookiee statements. 
A well-known example is that of the standard meter. Consider a competent
speaker making the following stipulation s: “This length is one meter”, while point
at a particular metal rod. We know that, whatever the actual length of the relevant
metal rod is, it will be one meter long. Thus, regardless of contextual variations,
including variations in length of the relevant metal rod, the speaker making the stip-
ulation s will assert something true. This gets described in the two-dimensional
matrix as a necessary diagonal (see Matrix B). Suppose the stipulation takes place
in a context where the participants ignore what the actual length of the metal rod is,
and consider the following possibilities: world w1 where the length of the metal rod
the speaker refers to is in fact l1, and world w2 where it is l2, and l1 ≠ l2. 
B w1 w2
w1 T F
w2 F T
Not surprisingly, the same Wookiee problem arises. Whoever makes the stipu-
lation s will be asserting nontrivial information. Which proposition is she asserting?
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It will not be the diagonal, for it is trivial; and we cannot pick a horizontal proposi-
tion because there is not enough information, including the semantic one, to deter-
mine whether we are in w1 or w2. It is also not viable to diagonalize, since the
resulting proposition will still be trivial. Furthermore, if we pay close attention to
the process of accommodation, by means of which the fact that the speech act has
taken place is included in the context, we realize that there is enough information
among the presuppositions to preclude the semantic information from being inform-
ative and, thus, from determining the content of the assertion.
It seems at least intuitively correct to interpret the speaker issuing the stipula-
tion s as asserting something like (B): 
(B): From now on ‘one meter’ will be correferential with this use ‘this length’. 
There are at least two reasons to think that the information has to be so under-
determined. On the one hand, stipulations are ways of “coining” new terms. Ludlow
2006 and 2008 forcefully argues for a dynamic view of the lexicon according to
which “discourse participants routinely mint new linguistic items” and also that
what seem to be “common coins […] are typically “thin” – in the sense that their
meanings are underdetermined and fleshed out on a case-by-case basis.” [Ludlow,
2008, p. 115] If, as Ludlow suggests, commonly used terms have a very underde-
termined meaning, one should expect that new, not previously used, terms have a
radically underdetermined meaning, if any at all, at the moment of their issuing.
This claim is rather uncontroversial: if we want to introduce the term ‘T’ into our lin-
guistic practice we cannot do this by presupposing that ‘T’ means m, for in order to
be understood we would have to presuppose that our audience presupposes that ‘T’
means m. That is tantamount to presupposing that ‘T’ has already been introduced.
On the other hand, and partly in virtue of the previous consideration, there is no
way to further determine the information conveyed by s. One might think, for exam-
ple, that what the speaker conveys is, at least, a little bit more determined than (B),
something perhaps like (D):
(D) From now on ‘one meter’ will refer to this length.
However, the context in which s appears offers no way to determine what ‘this
length’ refers to. All the participants can learn from the speaker’s issuing of s is that
‘one meter’ refers to whatever it is that the length of the relevant metal rod is. So it
seems that the only way of taking (D) as appropriately describing the information
conveyed by the speaker’s issuing of s is to take it to mean something like (B).
(B): From now on ‘one meter’ will be correferential with this use of ‘this
length’. 
If so, then it seems that the content of the speaker’s stipulation s: “This length
is one meter” is in fact determined by sheer accommodation. As it happens with
Wookiee statements, once the participants accommodate the fact that the speaker
has uttered the sentence ‘This length is one meter’, they can infer (B) without both-
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ering to consider the meaning of the terms used. All they need to know to draw that
inference is that the relevant speech act is a stipulation, but that piece of knowledge
is certainly not semantic but merely contextual. 
It seems, then, that stipulations, such as the one described, constitute another
counterexample against the semanticist assumption.
Semanticist Assumption (SA): the content of an assertion is determined either by
the semantically defined content of the expression used or by the interaction
between the latter and the context.
For it seems that the information asserted by the speaker’s issuing of s: “This
length is one meter” is something like (B), which is fully determined by merely
accommodating the fact that the speech act has taken place, prior to the acceptance
of any semantic information. Furthermore, it seems that (B) simply does not express
any of the information that the English sentence ‘This length is one meter’ may
semantically encode.
6. Objections and replies
Could the semanticist philosopher of language not claim that the English sen-
tence ‘This length is one meter’ semantically encodes the information that “ ‘this
length’ and ‘one meter’ are correferential”? If so, could she not claim, furthermore,
that the content of the speaker’s issuing of s is in fact semantically defined? 
There is in fact a rather simple move that the semanticist could make: to claim
that part of the lexical meaning of each word is the word itself. Based on evidence
from linguistic practices, Geurts 1998 claims that “ALL expressions from any lan-
guage are equivocal in a way: besides their ordinary meaning(s) they can also be
used to designate themselves.”[Geurts, 1998, p. 291] Semanticist philosophers may
want to follow Geurts and claim, for example, that every referential expression has
at least two referents: the object it is ordinarily used to refer and the expression
itself.
From this it would follow, against what I said toward the end of last section, that
the information conveyed by the issuing of the stipulation s: “This length is one
meter”, namely, that ‘this length’ and ‘one meter’ are correferential, can be seman-
tically determined. In other words, if the semanticist makes the “equivocal” move
described by Geurts 1998, she could claim that the proposition asserted by issuing
s could be either one of the semantically defined contents of the relevant English
sentence or the result the interaction of the latter with the context.
Furthermore, the semanticist could make a similar claim about the cases of what
I have called “Wookiee” statements. After all, the information conveyed by Tom’s
assertion of p: “I am here”, namely, that Tom is in his office, coincides with the
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proposition determined by the interaction of the semantically defined content of the
English sentence ‘I am here’ and the relevant context. So, it seems that even with
Wookiee statements the content of the assertion could be semantically determined,
either by the semantic content or by the interaction of the latter with the context. 
These objections will help clarify the point I am trying to make. I am not claim-
ing that the content of Wookiee assertions or statements cannot or could not be
semantically determined either by the semantic content or by its interaction with the
context. What I am claiming is that the content of these peculiar assertions is not,
as a matter of fact, semantically determined at all, not even partly so. 
Similarly, the argument for my central thesis does not consist in showing that
the asserted content cannot by semantically determined. Rather, the argument con-
sists in showing that the relevant information is contextually conveyed in a purely
non-semantic manner. To do this I have shown that prior to the acceptance of the
semantic content of the sentence uttered, i.e., even before any assignment of seman-
tic values, the audience has already inferred the relevant asserted information. Thus,
even if that same information can be semantically determined, the semantic content
is redundant and, hence, useless for truth-conditional or content purposes. As the
solution to the Wookiee problem shows, the only role that semantic content plays in
these cases is rather peripheral: it helps the speaker be respectful, clear, etc.
That much is clear for the case of Tom’s assertion p, and in general for appro-
priate uses of sentences such as’ as ‘I am speaking now’, ‘I am here now’, and ‘I
exist’. But something similar can be said about stipulations such as the issuing of s:
“This length is one meter.” The metalinguistic information conveyed by such a stip-
ulation, namely, that ‘this length’ is correferential with ‘one meter’, gets conveyed
prior to the assignment of semantic values to ‘This length is one meter’. The seman-
tic information encoded by this English sentence does not determine the content of
the stipulation. That job has already been done. Still, the sentence’s semantic infor-
mation is useful for manner’s sake: since the metalinguistic information associated
with it will coincide with the already determined content, it will help the speaker be
clear, respectful, etc. 
7. The inclusive view
I have argued all along for a more inclusive view of assertive content. On this
view, the semantically defined content of the sentence(s) used may not at all deter-
mine the content of an assertion, not even partly so. This goes against what I called
the Semanticist Assumption.
Semanticist Assumption (SA): the content of an assertion is determined either by
the semantically defined content of the expression used or by the interaction
between the latter and the context.
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On this more inclusive view what we get is something like Reasonable
Assertion (RA).
Reasonable Assertion (RA): the content of an assertion may be determined by
different means, on a case by case basis, and by what appears to be the most rea-
sonable manner. It is sometimes determined by the semantically defined content of
the expression used or by its interaction with the context, but purely contextual non-
semantic features may also determine it.
There are very good reasons to endorse RA instead of the traditional SA. First
and foremost, RA will allow us to handle what would otherwise be problematic
Wookiee assertions. This will potentially have further ramifications. Unlike SA, RA
is open to assertions being a more flexible act as it, intuitively, appears to be. Such
a flexible and inclusive position seems, in principle, more attractive than the strin-
gent semanticist one.
Second, RA will help us avoid certain philosophical puzzles. At least since
Kripke 1980, some have thought that certain special assertions provide speakers
with what would otherwise by a rather doubtful kind of knowledge: that of contin-
gent yet a priori truths. Such knowledge seems philosophically suspect for it pur-
ports to be about the world of our experience even though the access to it is inde-
pendent of our experience. 
Kripke 1980 argues that issuing stipulations, such as s: “This length is one
meter”, provide the speaker with such contingent a priori knowledge. Further dis-
cussion (see Stalnaker 1978 and Chalmers 2002) has portrayed such contingent a
priori truths as describing a two-dimensional matrix with contingent horizontals
and a necessary diagonal.6 If we accept RA and, with it, the reasonable account of
the Wookiee problem (see section 4), we can explain why such assertions seem spe-
cial without accepting that they provide speakers with anything like contingent a
priori knowledge. These assertions are special because their content is not deter-
mined semantically, not even partly so. Their content is, rather, contextually deter-
mined. And it is uncontroversial that there is no a priori access to contextual infor-
mation: it must be acquired through experience. Thus, such assertions may provide
speakers with contingent truths about the world of their experience, but there is no
experience-independent access to such truths. 
I hope this is enough to convince the reader that we need to give up our seman-
ticist assumption in favor of a more reasonable account of assertion. Those that are
not convinced will at least have to face a substantial challenge: to give a semanti-
cist-friendly solution to the Wookiee problem.
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